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tion calling for a construction of the Parole Act. 5 In People
ex rel.Richardsonv. Ragen,66 a paroled prisoner had been inducted
into military service shortly before the time when a recommendation for his final discharge was made to the State Division of
Paroles. Pursuant to this recommendation, a certificate of discharge was issued and approved by the Governor but before it
could be delivered to the prisoner he was rearrested for being
absent without leave, for driving a stolen car, and for carrying a
loaded revolver. He was surrendered to the state authorities
under a parole violation warrant and was recommitted to the
state penitentiary upon revocation of the order granting him his
final discharge. The prisoner contended that his recommittment
as a parole violator was improper as he had, upon his induction
into service, been promised his final discharge within six weeks
thereafter and further that, with the issuance of his discharge
certificate, the parole authorities ceased to have any jurisdiction.
The court, however, construed the statute to require actual delivery and receipt of the certificate by the parolee before jurisdiction
would cease.
V. FAMILY LAW
Efforts made at a prior session of the Illinois legislature to
halt the growing divorce rate, as evidenced by passage of Senate
Bill 415 and other measures similarly designed,1 have gone largely
for naught for the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Hunt v.
County of Cook,2 declared the bills unconstitutional because contrary to the prohibition against special or local laws.8 If wholesale reform is still believed necessary, it is apparent that any act
passed must be state-wide in application and not limited in scope
to Cook County.
At decidedly increasing intervals of time, a case comes up for
appellate review which requires an interpretation of that para65

The case particularly concerned Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 807.

66400 Ill. 191, 79 N. E. (2d) 479 (1948).

1 Laws 1947, p. 813; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 37, § 105.1 et seq.
2398 Ill. 412, 76 N. E. (2d) 48 (1947).
3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
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graph of the Divorce Act which sets forth the grounds for divorce. 4
In Getz v. Getz,5 the question was posed as to whether or not a
conviction by a military court for desertion in time of war might
properly be classified as a conviction for felony or other infamous
crime so as to serve as a ground for divorce. The Criminal Code
defines a felony as "an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary' ' and only indirectly designates
what crimes are infamous.7 Conviction for desertion in time of
war by a military court was held not to be included within the
meaning of the Divorce Act for the reason that the punishment
to be imposed upon the defendant, if found guilty by the military
tribunal, is optional and not absolute." Other factors, however,
also bore heavily on the decision. They were (1) the fact that the
offense of desertion is unknown to the civil law of today;9 (2) that
military courts are without the pale of the judicial department
of the government;1° and (3) sharp procedural differences exist
between a court-martial and a civil court.1 ' The firm policy of the
state to favor the continuance of the marital relationship and not
12
its dissolution was also noted.
The poinit at which a divorce decree becomes final was also
made the basis of dispute. In ordinary civil actions, the plaintiff
may experience considerable difficulty before having an action dismissed except with the concurrence of the defendant, 13 particuIll. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 1.
5332 Ill. App. 364, 75 N. E. (2d) 530 (1947), noted in 36 Ill.B. J. 423, 23 Notre
Dame Lawyer 405.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 585.
7 Ibid., § 587.
8 The court found support for this view in Lamkin v. People, 94 I1. 501 (1880),
where it was held that where the punishment prescribed by statute was either by
imprisonment in the penitentiary or by fine the rule of construction required that
"unless It clearly appears the offense was intended to be denominated a felony, it
shall be denominated a misdemeanor." See 94 Ill. 501 at 504.
96 C. J. S., Army and Navy, § 54.
10 36 Am. Jur., Military Law, § 44; 6 C. J. S., Army and Navy, § 51.
116 C. J. S., Army and Navy, § 57.
12 Johnson v. Johnson, 381 Ill. 362, 45 N. E. (2d) 625 (1942) ; Tripp v. Payne,
339 Ill. 178, 171 N. E. 131 (1930).
IsfI1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 176. See also Flassig v. Newman, 317 Ill. App.
635, 47 N. E. (2d) 527 (1943), noted In 21 CHICAGO-KENT L&w REviEW 348; Kosmerl
v. Sevin, 295 Ill. App. 345, 15 N. E. (2d) 20 (1938) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. County of Cook, 279 Ill. App. 462 (1935).
4
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larly after trial has been had. A more lenient view would seem
indicated where a divorce is involved, according to the holding in
Norwood v. Norwood.'4 Plaintiff there petitioned to dismiss her
complaint after evidence had been heard, after the trial court had
suggested that a decree would be forthcoming, and after plaintiff
had accepted some of the benefits of the indicated decree in the
form of the payment of money, part of a property settlement.
Representatives of the defendant had contended that, practically
speaking, final judgment had been rendered when the court pronounced the words "divorce granted" after hearing the testimony.
The Appellate Court ruled, consonant with chancery practice, that
the decree was not finally rendered until entered or filed of record,
until which time the plaintiff retained the right to have the suit
dismissed. The presence of a decree, however, is of no coiisequence if the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because
of the non-residence of plaintiff within the county where the
divorce action was filed. 15 Being void, the decree may be attacked
collaterally despite the fact that the thirty-day period for vacating
the decree has passed and rights of third persons have intervened.
For that reason, in Meyer v. Meyer,16 the Appellate Court reversed
a trial court holding which had by-passed the jurisdictional question, saying "a void judgment or order may be vacated at any
time and that the doctrines of laches and estoppel do not apply."17
An important and novel question concerning alimony was
presented in the case of Arnold v. Arnold.18 Plaintiff therein, hav14 333 Ill. App. 469, 77 N. E. (2d) 552 (1948).
The court not only relied on Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 176, but also on Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Superior
Court of Cook County, where the case was heard, which provides that a divorce
decree shall be entered within ten days following the hearing and that, prior
to entry of the decree, a transcript of the evidence shall be presented and approved
by the court.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 5.
16 333 Ill. App. 450, 77 N. E. (2d) 556 (1948).
17 333 Ill. App. 450 at 468, 77 N. E. (2d) 556 at 564. The lower court had decided
that the rights of third parties, that is of the wife and child of the marriage of the
defendant-husband which occurred after a divorce awarded to him on his counterclaim in the original action, overshadowed the jurisdictional question and justified
dismissing the first wife's petition to vacate the decree.
18332 1l1. App. 586, 76 N. E. (2d) 335 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 344.
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ing previously been granted a divorce with alimony, petitioned
the court to materially increase the amount of the award on the
ground that she had a right to share in her former husband's
prosperity even though the increase in wealth came to him after
their divorce. The court agreed that it had the power, in view of
the improved financial condition, to grant the ex-wife an increase
in alimony to offset the decrease in the purchasing power of the
dollar1 9 and to enable her to meet the burden of income tax on
such alimony 20 but pointed out that her only right was to be maintained, so far as possible, in the station of life to which her
husband had accustomed her as of the date of the original decree.
As the present statute on the subject does not provide for this
contingency, 21 the court felt obliged to stay within the limits of
its jurisdiction although differences existing between the instant
case and the holding in Hoover v. Hoover2 2 were aptly noted.
The usual method pursued in this state for the enforcement
of the payment of alimony in arrears arising under a decree of a
sister state has been by first requiring reduction of the arrears to
judgment by appropriate action in the sister state, thereafter to
be followed by a suit in debt on such judgment here. 23 In 1942,
however, the Appellate Court for the Second District, in the case
of Rule v. Rule, 24 departed from this time-honored practice by
granting equitable relief against the defaulting defendant under
19 Gehlbach v. Gehlbach, 219 Ill. App. 503 (1920).
Mo. App. 416, 239 S. W. 1093 (1922).
20 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 328 Ill. App. 133, 65 N. E.

See also Brown v. Brown, 209

(2d) 588 (1946).

21 ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 18. On the power of the court to modify alimony
awards under the statute, see Recklein v. Recklein, 327 Ill. App. 641 at 644, 64
N. E. (2d) 787 at 789 (1946).
22307 Ill. App. 590, 30 N. E. (2d) 940 (1940). The wife there petitioned for a
large increase in support money payable under a separate maintenance decree,
prosperity having caught up with her husband. The court allowed the prayer of
the petition. It must be remembered that, after a separate maintenance decree, the
parties remain married and the wife, although living apart from her husband, may
properly share in his good fortune. Absolute divorce, in contrast, terminates the
marriage status; the alimony award being viewed as a substitute for the duty of
support which had existed prior to the decree. See Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill.
146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925).
23 Paulin v. Paulin, 195 Ill. App. 350 (1915).
24313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N. E. (2d) 379 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
RE;vEw 46-7.
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an alimony decree of a sister state. The Appellate Court for the
First District, in the case of Clubb v. Clubb,25 appears to have
carried that concept even farther by first adopting it for use to
secure payment of alimony awarded by a decree of an English
court and second, to hold the obligated person in contempt for
non-compliance of the Illinois decree based thereon. The practice,
if upheld, recommends itself as being not only a less expensive
but also a far more effective weapon than is the older view on the
subject.
Independently of divorce and the incidents thereof, other
questions concerning the law regarding husband and wife require
attention. The case of Olmsted v. Olmsted26 discusses anew the
power of a court of equity, acting in a suit for separate maintenance, to adjudicate property rights as between the litigants. In
that action, the trial court had entered a decree for separate maintenance and, inter alia, had ordered that plaintiff be awarded a
sum of money "from the monies on deposit in a certain vault."
Defendant appealed from that part of the decree which contained
the property adjudication, asserting that, in a separate maintenance suit, the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine property rights. Because of the existence of certain prior cases adjudicated in the appellate courts of this state, 27 some doubt had been
introduced into the law on that subject. In the instant case, however, it was pointed out that any uncertainty as to the correct
rule to be applied had its origin in dicta 28 rather than in any
authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court. The court found that
the validity of the rule argued for by defendant had been affirmed
in Petta v. Petta,29 the most recent case on the subject, so it
adopted the holding therein as indicative of the weight of authority
25334 Ill. App. 599, 80 N. E. (2d) 94 (1948).
Leave to appeal was allowed and
it is understood that the Illinois Supreme Court later reversed the holding therein.
26332 Ill. App. 454, 75 N. E. (2d) 774 (1947), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 492.
27 Grossman v. Grossman, 304 Ill. App. 507, 26 N.
. (2d) 678 (1940) ; Glennon
v. Glennon, 299 Ill. App. 13, 19 N.
. (2d) 412 (1939).
28 Decker v. Decker, 279 Ill. 300, 116 N. E. 688 (1917).
29321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d) 324 (1944), noted in 22 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
RvvImw 281.
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in this state. Without question the court may, in a case where an
absolute divorce is granted, adjudicate the property rights of the
parties, 30 but no similar power is conferred by the statute governing separate maintenance. There is occasion to believe, however,
that the provisions of the Civil Practice Act 8 ' and of Rule 12 of
the Illinois Supreme Court, 3 2 dealing with joinder of causes, would
permit a plaintiff to join a suit for separate maintenance with
one seeking an adjudication of property rights provided the complaint definitely avers the several claims as separate and distinct
causes of action. If the question of settlement of property rights
is presented simply as an incident to a single cause of action in
separate maintenance, the court would be without power to determine the respective property rights of the litigants. 33
84
The situation concerned in the federal case of Daily v. Parker
has, as could be expected, found a counterpart in Illinois in the
form of two cases entitled Johnson v. Luhman which have led to a
similar result. The suit of the Johnson children against Mrs.
Luhman for the alienation of their father's affections was noted
in a prior survey. 35 In the second case, that of the wife for the
alienation of her husband's affections, 36 the court answered defendant's argument, to the effect that the maintenance of such a suit
was contrary to the public policy of Illinois, by citing Heck v.
Schupp 3 7 as the last word on suits of this character. The complaint
of the wife having been filed prior to the effective date of the
statutes designed to restrict the scope of suits of that character,
30 II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 18.
31 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167, declares that parties "may plead as many causes of action,
counterclaims, defenses and matters in reply and rejoinder as they may have, and
each shall be separately designated and numbered."
32 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.12.
33 A worthwhile discussion of property rights in family law will be found in
Goldblatt, "Joint Tenancies and Estates in Matrimonial Law," 36 Ill. B. J. 377.
A list of articles and case comments on this decision
34 152 F. (2d) 174 (1945).
appears In Heindl, "A Remedy for All Injuries?", 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvI w
90.
35330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. (2d) 810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvIEw 260 and 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 62-3.
36 333 Ill. App. 418, 78 N. E. (2d) 107 (1948).
37394 I1. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 464 (1946).
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it is too early as yet to learn what effect such statutes will have
8
on litigation of this character.
A logical application of Section 8 of the Husband and Wife
dealing with rights between the spouses arising from services performed by one for the other, was made in Wilhelm v.
Industrial CoMmission40 where, in reversing the decision of a
circuit court and reinstating the original finding of the industrial
commission, the Supreme Court ruled that a husband was not
entitled to collect compensation for injuries resulting from labor
performed as an "employee" of the wife. The plaintiff contended
that the Workman's Compensation Act, 41 being a later enactment,
had operated to repeal Section 8 by implication at least as it might
have bearing in compensation cases. Repeal by implication not
being favored, 42 and the Husband and Wife Act having been
amended on several occasions, 43 the last time being in 1947, the
court felt that no change had been made in the law. There being no express provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act
to support any theory of liability as between husband and wife,
the court was held to the conclusion that the statute was not intended to make any change in the existing status of husband and
wife.
The question as to whether or not an allowance for attorneys
fees and expense money might be made to the "wife" in a suit
to annul a marriage had never before been presented to an Illinois
Act, 39

38 Laws 1947, pp. 796, 800, and 1181; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 34 and § 41,
and Ch. 89, § 25 et seq. Comment on the constitutionality of these statutes appears
in 30 Chicago Bar Rec. 127-33.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 60, § 8.
40 399 Ill. 80, 77 N. E. (2d) 174 (1948).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
42 Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distribution Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.
E. (2d) 940 (1936) ; Kizer v. City of Matoon, 332 Ill. 545, 164 N. E. 20 (1928).
43 The statute, since its original adoption, has been amended in other respects
in 1877, 1915 and 1947. On the particular problem, the court said, in 399 Ill. 80
at 88, 77 N. E. (2d) 174 at 178, that in view of the fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act was substituted as a "new remedy in lieu of common-law rights
and liabilities in case of injuries to employees, we are of the opinion the legislature
never intended the act to be applied to injuries sustained by husbands while performing services for their wives for which there was no right of action at common
law or by statute and thus open the field of liability, the extent of which cannot
be calculated."
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reviewing tribunal prior to the case of Arndt v. Arndt.44 The
plaintiff there had filed suit for the annulment of his marriage.
The trial court ruled against him. When plaintiff appealed, the
defendant petitioned for an order on plaintiff to pay attorneys
fees and expense money to enable her to defend the appeal. The
Appellate Court upheld the lower court both as to its dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint and its order for money payment.4 5
Plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. That
court reversed the holding on the ground that a court of equity,
in the absence of statute, has no power "to compel the support
' 46
of a wife, this being the husband's common law obligation.'
While that power is vested in the courts where the money payment is sought as an incident to a divorce 4 7 or to a separate
maintenance action,48 the legislature has adopted no statute governing annulment actions. No amount of legerdemain can change
the character of an annulment proceeding so as to bring it within
the comprehension of Section 15 of the Divorce Act for, as the
court clearly indicated, an annulment proceeding is designed to
have a marriage allegedly void judicially so declared, whereas a
divorce action seeks to dissolve a marriage admittedly valid. If no
marriage exists, no marital obligations can arise and, absent a
statute so compelling, there can be "no duty to pay support money
or attorney's fees."4 The court, naturally, did not indicate what
the result would be if annulment was denied, thereby recognizing
that a marriage did exist between the parties. It can only be supposed that such a holding would then open the door to a decree for
divorce or separate maintenance, if cause existed.

44 399 Ill. 490, 78 N. E.

(2d)

272 (1948).

45 331 Ill. App. 85, 72 N. E. (2d) 718 (1947).
46399 Ill. 490 at 495, 78 N. E. (2d) 272 at 275.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 16.
48 Ibid., Ch. 68, § 22.
49 399 Ill.
490 at 496, 78 N. E. (2d) 272 at 276.
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VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

A tangled story of a little-used country graveyard appears in
the report of the case of Smith v. Ladage.1 Land had there been
conveyed to named grantees as "Trustees of the Brush Creek
Burying Ground," and to their successors, without any limitation
or restriction other than might be inferred from the descriptive
words attached to the grantees' names. Occasional burials occurred from 1848 to 1922, subsequent to which time the cemetery
fell into disrepair and became overgrown with weeds, vines and
brush. In 1940, the defendants acquired title to the quarter-section of land from which the cemetery had been carved and thereafter, dealing with the township officials, obtained passage of a
vacation ordinance on condition the defendants would remove all
bodies and provide for the re-interment thereof in a nearby cemetery at their own expense. Upon completion of these conditions, a
quit-claim deed covering the cemetery site was given to defendants
and was duly recorded. Thereafter suit was brought by persons
who claimed an interest in the property, either by quit-claim from
the heirs of one of the original grantees 2 or as relatives of persons
buried in the cemetery, to prevent desecration of the burial ground.
A decree dismissing the suit was reversed because the court failed
to find proper compliance with the provisions of Section 1 of an
"Act to provide for the removal of cemeteries, ' 8 in that (1) the
assent of the trustees or persons controlling the cemetery had
not been obtained, and (2) there was no showing of "good cause"
for the removal as the evidence failed to indicate any danger to
public health or welfare. Mere neglect was not regarded sufficient
to constitute either abandonment or justification for the vacation
ordinance.
1397 Ill. 336, 74 N. E. (2d) 497 (1947).
2 The court decided the conveyance vested no title since the estate of the deceased trustee, he being one of joint trustees, passed to the survivor of the grantees
rather than to the heirs applying the rule laid down in Reichert v. Missouri & Illinois
Coal Co., 231 Ill. 238, 83 N. E. 166, 121 Am. St. Rept. 307 (1907).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 21, § 2.

